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Abstract - It is shown that concept lattices can be attached in a natural way to any voting protocol. The 
concept lattices of some voting protocols that are solvable with respect to some prominnent solution concepts 
and outcome-efficient are studied: it is proved that they typically amount to chains. 
 







Stefano Vannucci, Dipartimento di Economia Politica, Università degli Studi di Siena 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Voting protocols are decision mechanisms involving disclosure by participants
of private information concerning their own preferences. Voting protocols are
solvable with respect to some game-theoretic solution concept or rule if for any
admissible preference proﬁle there exists a non-empty set of solutions, and ef-
ﬁciently solvable if the resulting outcomes are Pareto eﬃcient. Thus eﬃciently
solvable protocols are of special interest in that they both enjoy a suitably
deﬁned strategic robustness and ensure Pareto-eﬃciency of the resulting strate-
gically stable outcomes.
Concept lattices of voting protocols provide a structural representation of
the a priori decision power of coalitions in terms of the events in outcome space
they are able to enforce. In particular, the lenght of the concept lattice of a
voting protocols does represent the layers of hierarchy among coalitions induced
by the protocol, while the width of the same lattice provides some information
about the extent to which coalitional decision power is distributed.
The present paper is devoted to the introduction and study of the concept
lattices of some prominent classes of eﬃciently solvable voting protocols. That
study is meant to provide some insight on the ‘structural’ distribution of decision
power among coalitions induced by a few protocols that are ‘nicely robust’ with
respect to some prominent game-theoretic solution concepts.
2 Model and results
2.1 Voting Protocols
Let N = {1,..,n} denote the set of players, X = {x1,..,xk} the set of outcomes,
and RX the set of linear (preference) orders on X. A strategic game form on
(N,X) is an array Γ =( N,X,(Si)i∈N,h) where Si is a set, the strategy set of
player i,i =1 ,..,n and h :
n Y
i=1
Si → X is a surjective function, the outcome func-
tion of Γ.A voting protocol (in strategic form, with ﬁxed agenda) for (N,X,RX)
is a strategic game form Γ =( N,X,(Si)i∈N,h) such that Si ⊇ RX for some
i ∈ N. Moreover, a voting protocol is said to be basic if Si = RX for any i ∈ N,
i.e. the outcome function of Γ is a social choice function.
A solution concept is a rule for solving games of a certain collection: e.g.
if RX is the set of admissible preferences for each player i ∈ N, then a solu-
tion concept for the set Γ(RN
X)=
©
(Γ,R N):RN ∈ RN
X
ª
of games induced by
game form Γ on the domain RN
X of all proﬁles of total preference preorders on




Si. A few concrete examples of so-
lution concepts including Nash equilibrium, strong equilibrium and coalitional
equilibrium with threats will be introduced and discussed below.
Let Γ b eav o t i n gp r o t o c o la n dσ a solution concept for Γ(RN
X).Then, voting
protocol Γ is said to be σ-solvable over preference domain RN
X if σ((Γ,R N)) 6= ∅
1for any RN ∈ RN
X.
Moreover, at any proﬁle of preference preorders RN =( R1,..,Rn) ∈ RN
X we

















Voting protocol Γ will be said to be eﬃciently σ-solvable over preference
domain RN
X if ∅ 6= h[ σ((Γ,R N))] ⊆ Par(RN) for any RN ∈ RN
X. It should be
emphasized that we do not impose any upper bound on the (ﬁnite) size of X.1
As mentioned in the Introduction, this paper will be devoted to the study of
concept lattices of certain important classes of eﬃciently solvable voting proto-
cols. This task will be accomplished by attaching certain coalitional game forms
to voting protocols.
In order to accomplish this task a few more notions are now to be introduced.
2.2 Coalitional Game Forms
A coalitional game form is a triple G =( N,X,E) where N and X are non-
empty sets denoting the sets of players and outcomes, respectively, and E :
P(N) → P(P(X)) is the coalitional power function: the ‘power-value’ E(S) of
coalition S ⊆ N is the collection of all events A ⊆ X coalition S ⊆ N is able to
‘force’ (under some suitable interpretation of the latter notion). We also assume
#N ≥ 2 and #X ≥ 2 in order to avoid trivialities. A coalitional game form
(N,X,E) is a (standard) eﬀectivity function (EF) if E satisﬁes the following
boundary conditions:
EF1) (Souvereignty) E(N) ⊇ P(X)\{∅};
EF2) (Null Set Normalization) E(∅)=∅;
EF3) (Exhaustiveness) X ∈ E(S) for any S, ∅ 6= S ⊆ N.
EF4) (Null Event Unenforceability) ∅ / ∈ E(S) for any S , ∅⊂S ⊆ N .
AC G Fi smonotonic if for any S,T ⊆ N and any A,B ⊆ X
[A ∈ E(S) and S ⊆ T entail A ∈ E(T)] and
[A ∈ E(S) and A ⊆ B entail B ∈ E(S)].
In what follows we shall conﬁne ourselves to monotonic CGFs.
Moreover, it is regular if for any S,T ⊆ N and A ⊆ X, A ∈ E(S) entails
X\A/ ∈ E(N\S), maximal if for any S,T ⊆ N and A ⊆ X, A / ∈ E(S) entails
X\A ∈ E(N\S), superadditive if for any S,T ⊆ N and A,B ⊆ X, A ∈ E(S),
B ∈ E(T) and S ∩ T = ∅ entail A ∩ B ∈ E(S ∪ T), convex if for any S,T ⊆ N
and A,B ⊆ X, A ∩ B ∈ E(S ∪ T) or A ∪ B ∈ E(S ∩ T) whenever A ∈ E(S)
and B ∈ E(T),a n dadditive if there exist positive probability measures p,q on
P(N),P(X) respectively s.t. A ∈ E(S) iﬀ p(S)+q(A) > 1 (an additive EF is
also convex).
A (monotonic) simple game on N is an order ﬁlter of (P(N),⊇) i.e. a set
W, P(N) ⊇ W 6= ∅, such that S ∈ W and T ⊇ S entail T ∈ W. The coalitions
1That kind of generality rules out simple majority voting protocols, which are strategically
robust only with (not more than) two outcomes.
2belonging to W are meant to represent the winning or all-powerful ones. Finally,
aC G F(N,X,E) is simple if there exists an order ﬁlter W of (P(N),⊇) such
that for any S ⊆ N, A ⊆ X, A ∈ E(S) if and only if either A = X and S 6= ∅
or A 6= ∅ and S ∈ W (notice that a simple EF is —by deﬁnition— both and
monotonic). Indeed, simple EFs amount to simple games as endowed with a
ﬁxed outcome set.
We are mainly interested in those CGFs -and EFs- that can represent the
decision power of coalitions under a certain (deterministic) decision mechanism,
or strategic game form as deﬁned above.
Now, the notion of decision power admits at least two distinct interpreta-
tions, namely “guaranteeing power” and “counteracting power” that in turn
correspond to the ability to force maximin and minimax outcomes, respectively.
Indeed, let Γ =( N,X,(Si)i∈N,h) be a voting protocol (or, for that matter,
any strategic game form). Then, the allocation of “guaranteeing power” under
voting protocol Γ is represented by the α − EF of Γ- denoted by Eα(Γ)-a s





A ⊆ X:atS ∈
Q
i∈S Si exists such that
h(tS,s N\S) ∈ A







Conversely, the allocation of “counteracting power” under voting protocol Γ
is represented by the β − EF of Γ, denoted by Eβ(Γ) and deﬁned as follows :
for any non-empty S ⊆ N
(Eβ(Γ))(S)=
½
A ⊆ X : for any sN\S ∈
Q
i∈N\S Si some tS ∈
Q
i∈S Si
and h(tS,s N\S) ⊆ A
¾
.
It is easily checked that (N,X,Eα(G)) is regular, (N,X,Eβ(G)) is maximal,
and both of them are monotonic satisfy null-event-unenforceability.C o n v e r s e l y ,
it is well-known that superadditivity and monotonicity of an EF G =( N,X,E)
imply that it is α-playable i.e. a strategic game form Γ0 exists such that E =
Eα(Γ0) : see Moulin(1983), and Otten,Borm,Storcken,Tijs(1995)).
2.3 Concept lattices of coalitional game forms and voting
protocols
We are now ready to introduce concept lattices of voting protocols.
The concept lattice of a CGF G can be deﬁned through the following steps.
First, deﬁne the functions hE : P(P(N)) → P(P(X)) and iE : P(P(X)) →
P(P(N)) for any S ⊆ P(N) , A ⊆ P(X) deﬁne
hE(S)={A ⊆ X : A ∈ E(S) for all S ∈ S} and
iE(A)={S ⊆ N : A ∈ E(S) for all A ∈ A}.
It is easily seen that (hE,iE) is a Galois connection between (P(P(N)),⊆)
and (P(P(X)),⊆) i.e. for any S,T ⊆ P(N), and A,B ⊆ P(X),
i) if S ⊆ T then hE(S) ⊆ hE(T),a n di fA ⊆ B then iE(B) ⊆ iE(A),a n d
ii) (iE ◦ hE)(S) ⊇ S,(hE ◦ iE)(A) ⊇ A.
Now, consider
C(G)={(S,A) ∈ P(P(N)) ×P(P(X)) : S = iE(A), and A = hE(S)}.
3In the language of formal concept analysis (see e.g. Ganter and Wille(1999))
an element (S,A) of C(G) is said to be a concept of the context G, with extent S
and intent A (the latter notions are amenable to straightforward dualizations).
Thus, the (dual)2 concept lattice of G (sometimes also referred to as its
Galois lattice)i sL(G)=( C(G), >) where for any (S1,A1),(S2,A2) ∈ C(G)
(S1,A1) > (S2,A2) iﬀ A1 ⊇ A2 (which is provably equivalent to S2 ⊇ S1),
and
(S1,A1) ∧ (S2,A2)=( iE(hE(S1 ∪ S2)),A1 ∩ A2)
(S1,A1) ∨ (S2,A2)=( S1 ∩ S2,hE(iE(A1 ∪ A2)).
It is also well-known and easily shown that both (iE ◦ hE):P(P(N)) →
P(P(N)) and (hE ◦ iE):P(P(X)) → P(P(X)) are closure operators with
respect to set-inclusion (recall that a closure operator K on a preordered set
(Y,>) is a function K : Y → Y such that for any y,x ∈ Y : K(y) > y,K(y) >
K(x) whenever y > x,a n dK(y) > K(K(y)) ), and extents and intents of
concepts are precisely the closed elements -or ﬁxed points- of (iE ◦ hE)and
(hE ◦ iE) respectively (i.e. (S,A) ∈ C(G) iﬀ S = iE(hE(S)) and A =
hE(iE(A))).We shall also denote (iE ◦ hE) and (hE ◦ iE) by KG and K∗
G,
respectively. The sets of all ﬁxed points of KG and K∗
G, are also called the
(Galois) closure systems of CGF G, and denoted by C and C∗, respectively.
Clearly enough, the concept lattice L(G) -that is also sometimes called the
Galois lattice of G (see e.g. Barbut and Monjardet (1970), chpt. V, vol.2) - is
lattice-isomorphic to the lattices of inclusion-ordered closure systems (C,⊆) and
(C∗,⊇), respectively (see Davey and Priestley (1990) , chpt. 11, p.227). Hence,
L(G) is complete, has a unique atom if G is null-set-normalized and a unique
co-atom if G satisﬁes null-event-unenforceability. Moreover, if G is linear then
L(G) is also linearly ordered.
Those basic facts concerning L(G) - which rely on the classic Birkhoﬀ’s theo-
rem on concrete -i.e. polarity-induced- Galois connections (see Birkhoﬀ(1967))-
can be summarized by the following3:
Proposition 1 Let G =( N,X,E) be a CGF. Then, a complete lattice
L(G) - the concept lattice of G,u n i q u e l yd e ﬁned up to isomorphisms- can be
canonically attached to G. Moreover, i) if G is null-set-normalized, then L(G)
is dense i.e. has a minimum that is meet-irreducible ; ii) if G satisﬁes null-
set-unenforceability, then L(G) is co-dense i.e. has a maximum that is join-
irreducible; iii) L(G) is ﬁnite whenever either N or X is ﬁnite; iv) if G is
linear then L(G) is a chain.
2To be sure, the concept lattice as deﬁned below is indeed endowed with the reverse ordering
of the concept lattice as usually deﬁned in the literature. Therefore, as mentioned above, what
is referred to as a ‘concept lattice’ in the text is in fact the dual of a concept lattice as usually
deﬁned. The reason I insist on dual concept lattices is my intention to focus on rankings of
coalitions in terms of decision power, relying on the ability to ‘force’ events as the relevant
criteria/attributes. By contrast, the concept lattice of a CGF in the standard sense is best
regarded as a classiﬁcation of the ‘resilience’ of (families of) events with respect to coalitional
capabilities to act.
3A similar result for the slightly more specialized case of EFs is presented and discussed
in Vannucci(1999).
4Remark 2 In particular, Proposition 1 ii) says that L(G)=1⊕B(L(G))⊕1
for some lattice B(L(G)) if G satisﬁes null-set-unenforceability and null-set-
normalization and L(G)=1⊕B(L(G)) if it is just null-set-normalized (where
1 denotes the degenerate 1-element lattice, and ⊕ denotes the linear or ordinal
sum operation: see e.g. Birkhoﬀ(1967), or Davey,Priestley(1990)). In any case,
we shall refer to the lattice B(L(G)) as the bulk of L(G) .
2.3.1 Eﬃciently dominant-strategy solvable voting protocols
To begin with, we consider an easy case namely the class of dominant-strategy
solvable voting protocols.
Let g =( N,X,(Si)i∈N,h,(Ri)i∈N) -with Ri ∈ RX for any i ∈ N-ag a m ei n
strategic form, and i ∈ N. A dominant strategy for i is a strategy si ∈ Si such
that for any s0
i ∈ Si
h(si,s N\{i})Rih(s0













Let us denote DSi(g) the set of dominant strategies for i,a n dDS(g)= Y
i∈N
DSi(g) the set of all proﬁles of dominant strategies of game g. Then, a
voting protocol Γ =( N,X,(Si)i∈N,h) is dominant-strategy solvable (or DS-
solvable) over preference domain RN
X if DS(g) 6= ∅ for any game g =( Γ,R N)
with RN ∈ RN
X.
It is easily checked that, as a Corollary to the well-known Gibbard-Satterthwaite
theorem (see e.g. Danilov, Sotskov (2002)) as combined with the so-called ‘rev-
elation principle’ that whenever #X > 3, dictatorial voting protocols are the
only eﬃciently DS-solvable ones ( a dictatorial voting protocol invariably selects
the most preferred outcome of a ﬁxed player, the dictator). As a consequence
of that fact, we have
Proposition 3 Let Γ =( N,X,(Si)i∈N,h) be an eﬃciently DS-solvable voting
protocol, Gα(Γ)=( N,X,Eα(Γ)),Gβ(Γ)=( N,X,Eβ(Γ)). Then C(Gα(Γ)) =
C(Gβ(Γ)) ' 4.
Remark 4 Notice that the concepts attached to a DS-solvable voting protocol
may be described by the following intents: ‘omnipotent’ coalitions (i.e. coalitions
able to enforce any event including the null event), ‘all-powerful’ coalitions (i.e.
coalitions able to enforce any event except for the null event), ‘essentially power-
less’ coalitions, and ‘absolutely powerless’ coalitions. The corresponding extents
are, respectively, the empty set, the ultraﬁlter of all coalitions including the dic-
tator among their members, the set of all nonempty coalitions, and the set of
all coalitions.
52.3.2 Acceptable voting protocols
Next, we consider eﬃciently Nash equilibrium solvable voting protocols (such
protocols are usually referred to as acceptable). Let g =( N,X,(Si)i∈N,h,(Ri)i∈N)
be a game in strategic form. A Nash equilibrium of g is a strategy proﬁle
s =( si)i∈N such that h(si,s N\{i})Rih(s0
i,s N\{i}) for any i ∈ N and any s0
i ∈ Si.
The set of Nash equilibria of game g is denoted by NE(g).
No general characterization of acceptable voting protocols is available. The
simplest example of an acceptable voting protocol is perhaps the kingmaker
protocol ΓK =( N,X,(SK
i )i∈N,h K) deﬁned as follows:
S1 = N\{1},S i = RX for any i ∈ N\{1},a n d




Hence, under the kingmaker protocol as presented above player 1 selects a
dictator or ‘king’ who in turn proceeds to select the ﬁnal outcome.
Moreover, a kind of ‘universal’ family of eﬃciently Nash-equilibrium-solvable
voting protocols ΓM(.) =( N,X,(S
M(.)
i )i∈N,h M(.)) -the family of so-called Maskin
protocols (see again Danilov, Sotskov(2002)) - can be deﬁned as follows. A cor-
respondence f : RN
X →→ X is Maskin-monotonic if for any RN,Q N ∈ RN
X and
any y ∈ X,
if y ∈ f(RN) and {x ∈ X : yRix} ⊆ {x ∈ X : yQix}for any i ∈ N,t h e n
x ∈ f(QN).
Let f : RN
X →→ X be a Maskin-monotonic non-empty-valued correspon-
dence, then ΓM(f) =( N,X,(S
M(f)










and Z+is the set of non-
negative integers) and,
for any s =( si)i∈N ≡ ((RN








⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
x : if (RN
i ,x i)=( RN,x) for all i ∈ N
y : if there exists k ∈ N such that
(RN
i ,x i)=( RN
j ,x j)=( RN,x) 6=( QN
k ,x k) for all i,j ∈ N\{k}
and xRkxk
xi∗ : where i∗ =
X
i∈N
zi(mod#N),o t h e r w i s e
⎫
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎬
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎭
.
Thus, under the Maskin protocol for choice rule f every player chooses a
point of the graph of f and a nonnegative integer. If all players happen to choose
t h es a m ep o i n t(RN,x) the ﬁnal outcome is x. If all players choose the same point
(RN,x) except for one ‘dissident’ j who chooses (QN
k ,x k) then the outcome is
xk if xk is no better than x according to preference order Rk, and x otherwise.




puted to identify the player i∗having that number as her identity number: the
ﬁnal outcome is the outcome corresponding to the point of f chosen by player
6i∗.
It can be shown that such a family of Maskin protocols is ‘universal’ for
acceptable voting protocols in that for each of the latter there is a Maskin
protocol which is behaviorally equivalent to the latter (to the extent that Nash
equilibrium predicts correctly the participants’ behaviour). It is readily checked
that the following proposition holds true.
Proposition 5 Let f : RN
X →→ X be a Maskin-monotonic and Pareto eﬃcient
non-empty valued correspondence4 and ΓM(f) =( N,X,(S
M(f)
i )i∈N,h M(f)) the
corresponding Maskin voting protocol. Then,
C(Gα(ΓM(f))) = C(Gβ(ΓM(f))) ' 4.5
Remark 6 The concepts attached to the Maskin voting protocol may also be de-
scribed by the following intents: ‘omnipotent’ coalitions (i.e. coalitions able to
enforce any event including the null event), ‘all-powerful’ coalitions (i.e. coali-
tions able to enforce any event except for the null event), ‘essentially powerless’
coalitions, and ‘absolutely powerless’ coalitions. The corresponding extents, are
respectively the empty set, the set of all coalitions including at least n−1 agents,
the set of all nonempty coalitions, and the set of all coalitions.
Indeed, both eﬃciently Nash equilibrium solvable and DS-solvable voting
protocols as considered above induce a sharp distribution of decision power
among coalitions, and the corresponding eﬀectivity functions are simple. This
is suitabbly reﬂected in the structure and ‘short’ length of their concept lattices.
2.3.3 Strong-equilibrium solvable and core solvable voting protocols
Finally, we turn to some solution concepts implying coalition formation and
coordinated coalitional behaviour. Again, let g =( N,X,(Si)i∈N,h,(Ri)i∈N)
be a game in strategic form. A strong equilibrium of g is a strategy proﬁle





exists i ∈ T such that h(sT,s N\T)Rih(s0
T,s N\T).A coalitional equilibrium
with threats of g is a strategy proﬁle s =( si)i∈N such that for any coalition








Si and i ∈ T such that
h(sT,s N\T)Rih(s0
T,s 0
N\T) (notice that coalitional equilibrium outcomes with
threats of g do exactly coincide with the core6 outcomes of g). Clearly, since
4Notice that Maskin-monotonic, Pareto eﬃcient and nonempty valued correspondences
deﬁned over RN
X do clearly exist, the Pareto correspondence being an obvious example (under
mild restrictions on the outcome set X).
5Similarly, C(Gα(ΓK)) = C(Gβ(ΓK)) ' 4
6An outcome x ∈ X is dominated within a game in coalitional form G =( N,X,E,(<i
)i∈N), where (N,X,E) is a coalitional game form and (<i)i∈N is the proﬁle of total preference
preorders on X,i ft h e r ee x i s tA ⊆ X and S ⊆ N such that A ∈ E(S) and for any y ∈ A and
i ∈ S both y <i x and not x <i y.T h ecore of G is the set of outcomes of X which are not
dominated in G.
7the grand coalition N is one of the feasible coalitions, both strong equilibrium
outcomes and coalitional equilibrium outcomes with threats are by deﬁnition
Pareto eﬃcient.
It turns out that certain voting-by-limited-veto protocols ( as brieﬂyi n t r o -
duced in section 2 above, and thoroughly analyzed elsewhere, e.g. Danilov,Sotskov(2002))
enjoy both strong equilibrium solvability and coalitional equilibrium with threats
solvability over preference domain RN
X. Of course, such voting-by-veto protocols
rely on a considerably more complex allocation of decision power than the vot-
ing protocols considered previously. This is neatly reﬂected by the properties
of their concept lattices. As a prominent example of a voting-by-limited-veto
procedure that shares anonymity and neutrality properties with majoritarian-
like schemes we shall focus on a version of the proportional veto protocol, ﬁrst
introduced by Moulin (see e.g. Moulin,Peleg(1982), Moulin(1983), Peleg(1984),
Abdou,Keiding(1991), Danilov,Sotskov(1993,2002)). Namely, we consider a pro-
portional veto protocol with endogenous agenda formation that can be informally
described as follows. A distinguished outcome x∗-t h e“status quo”-i si d e n t i -
ﬁed. Then, each player makes k proposals, is informed on the resulting set of
outcomes, and issues k vetos - according to a preﬁxed order -o nn o n - v e t o e d
alternatives. The unique non-vetoed outcome is selected. The corresponding
EF EPV (which is regular and maximal, hence unambiguously determined) is
deﬁned by the following rule:
for any S ⊆ N, A ⊆ X , A ∈ EPV(S) if and only if
d(kn+1 )s
ne >k n+1− a
where s =# S, n =# N,a n da =# A .
Since each coalition-size corresponds to a distinctive “degree” of decision
power, the concept lattice L(GPV) is easily computed. Thus, it is straightfor-
ward to establish validity of the following
Proposition 7 Let GPV =( N,X,EPV) be the proportional veto EF as deﬁned
above. Then, L(GPV)=1 ⊕ n ⊕ 1 (where n denotes the chain of size n ).
Clearly, the intents of the concepts attached to the proportional veto protocol
may be described as ‘the coalitions that are able to veto at least k·l outcomes’,
with k · l 6 k · n. The corresponding extents amount to player (sub)sets of
cardinality l, 0 6 l 6 n.
It should also be remarked that the concept lattices of non-anonymous
versions of that voting by veto protocol are also chains.
3C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
The concept lattices of some prominent eﬃciently solvable voting protocols have
been introduced and described. It turns out that all of them are chains. More-
over, in nontrivial cases their sizes do not depend on the cardinality of either the
player set or the outcome set, except for the voting by veto protocol. Therefore,
even allowing for quite diﬀerent choices of the solution concept, the distribution
8of coalitional decision power induced by known eﬃciently solvable voting proto-
cols apparently share a rather simple (concept-latticial) structure. It remains to
be seen whether eﬃciently solvable voting protocols endowed with more general
concept lattices do exist.
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